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FOURTEEN 
The uses of catastrophism
Simon Winlow
The long sleep
Let’s be honest with ourselves. We face today a broad range of truly 
monumental problems. It is clear that we remain grossly unprepared 
for many of the challenges that lie in front of us. Rather than 
acknowledging their huge scale and interconnectedness, and the hard 
work and sacrifice needed to overcome them, we tend to display a 
collective form of what psychoanalysts call ‘fetishistic disavowal’. We 
know what we would prefer not to know, and so we continue on as if 
we were, in fact, not in possession of this disturbing knowledge. This 
knowledge strikes us as too difficult to deal with, too threatening to be 
faced head on, and so it is disavowed and forced from consciousness. 
Having convinced ourselves that we do not know of the problems that 
lie before us, or that we lack the capacity to do anything about them, 
we are granted leave to blithely stumble onwards with our own lives, 
absorbed in our own struggles and idiosyncratic preoccupations. We 
carry only the vague hope that others will act on our behalf, or that 
some mystical force might intervene to ensure that everything continues 
to rumble on in the normal manner. Despite the cacophony of criticism 
levelled at governments and elites, we appear still to have a general faith 
that those in power have the skills and information needed to guide us 
on to the best path forward. Given time, we hope, our political elites 
will see sense, shake off their lethargy and formulate a plan to prevent 
the various catastrophes that appear to await us in the near future. Let 
me be absolutely clear about this: they will not. At least, not without 
being forced to do so.Let me begin this brief contribution with a 
preliminary and rather basic observation: if our goal is to rejuvenate 
the social – to make it real and vibrant to the extent that people are 
compelled to abandon solipsistic individualism and fight their way free 
from the prevailing culture of depressive cynicism before once again 
investing in collective projects, goals and identities – there must be a 
corresponding rejuvenation of the political. The supremacy of neoliberal 
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Building better societies
political economy in the West, tied as it is to a doctrine of asocial 
liberalism and the stupid pleasures of 24-hour hyper-consumerism, 
has depoliticised our cultures and fragmented and individualised our 
society. It makes no sense to argue otherwise.
There are one or two signs of life at the margins, but millions across 
the country now recognise that our political system is banal, stage-
managed and profoundly alienating. On the surface, our political system 
seems dedicated to openness, fairness and inclusivity, but huge swathes 
of the population feel entirely cut adrift from those who purport to 
represent them, and those who claim to govern in the best interests 
of all. The very things that our parliamentarians agree on and take 
for granted are the very things that a properly political culture would 
debate and discuss. Alternatives to the present orthodoxy, especially 
with regard to political economy, are noticeable only by their absence. 
The effects of this long-standing political inertia are legion.
We tend to assume that it is the presence of objects, forces or ideas 
that produce negative social consequences. However, absence, or 
lack, can also be causative. When things could and perhaps should be 
present, but remain absent, there is an effect. The failure of our culture 
and our politics to produce inspiring, understandable and appealing 
alternatives to the present produces effects that can be seen around us 
all of the time. We continue to live in the shadow of a stalled dialectic. 
We cannot move forward with purpose because we cannot imagine 
appealing alternatives to liberal capitalism and parliamentary democracy. 
Even now, with the first signs of epochal crisis coming into view, we 
cannot countenance the prospect of deep structural intervention. We 
refuse to consider the curtailment of consumer lifestyles. We cannot 
disconnect ourselves from the lures and enticements of consumer 
society and e [[missing word here?]]. Every attempt to improve 
things at a fundamental level will, we are told, prove to be an utter 
disaster for all of us. 
The commonly identified positive features of consumer capitalism 
outweigh its increasingly stark negativities. Our investment in the 
system is so long-running, so complete, that we cling to its structures, 
codes, promises and rhythms, despite the fact that knowledge of 
capitalism’s dark side is widely dispersed throughout our culture. We 
cling to the hope that the system can be rehabilitated, that it can be 
made moral by the compassion of those people who work within 
its structures, that the will of the people will be acted on and that 
the avarice of profit motive will soon be forced into a cage of social 
democratic regulation. 
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The uses of catastrophism
The lengths we go to avoid doing what we know is necessary gives 
us some indication of just how successful the ruling ideology has 
been in its drive to integrate all into its project of endless renewal 
and continuity. Surely, with a little adjustment here and there, we can 
continue to move incrementally toward the civilisational ideal? Surely, 
given time, the government will listen to reason and begin to utilise 
serious social scientific evidence in the formulation of social policy? 
Surely it remains possible for us to harness the raw power of the 
market and to use it in the best interests of all? Tragedy, we are told, 
accompanies fundamental change. Any attempt to make things better 
will make things worse. Isn’t it true that all alternatives to parliamentary 
capitalism are repressive, inhumane and totalitarian? Shouldn’t we just 
move forward in a progressive direction using incremental adjustments 
to policy? Won’t the simple strategy of accentuating the positive and 
eliminating the negative take us in the right direction?
I am often told that my desire to see fundamental social change is 
idealistic. I am told to be pragmatic and focus on achievable goals. 
This strikes me as quite odd, given the scale of the problems we face. 
Isn’t it idealistic to believe that what exists can be rehabilitated? Isn’t 
it idealistic to believe that our leaders will soon guide us away from 
the precipice? Isn’t it idealistic to imagine that myriad technological 
fixes will magically emerge from the corporate sector to head off the 
worst effects of climate change? What we need now is a cold realism, 
a realism that acknowledges the absolute necessity of jumping into the 
driver’s seat and attempting to steer the juggernaut in another direction 
(see Hall and Winlow, 2015). The fundamental realist question today 
is this: what kinds of intervention can be made, and just how deep 
do these interventions need to go in order to significantly alter what 
appears to be our destiny?
The failure of academia and politics to equip people with a positive 
vision means that we leave the door open for the politics of negativity 
and hate to wander in and make themselves at home. Fear and 
anxiety are everywhere these days. But the absence from the political 
imagination of positive alternatives to our present way of life also feeds 
into the cynicism and depressive hedonia – a ‘hedonism’ infused with 
sadness and dissatisfaction rather than joy – that are such important 
features of life in the real world, away from the glittering metropolis, 
away from the university campus, away from the corporate office, 
beyond the corridors and meeting rooms of Westminster. When we 
believe that no one really cares, that nothing much can be done, and 
that nothing will ever change, we tend to beat an understandable 
retreat toward hedonism and gratification. However, such activities 
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Building better societies
fail to yield any genuine sense of satisfaction or joy. Rather, there is a 
palpable sense of lack, of absence, a perennial sense that something is 
missing (Winlow and Hall, 2013).
Part of this is to do with the fact that consumer culture now issues 
an injunction to enjoy. We are instructed to chase after hedonistic 
experiences, to indulge beyond reason, to never miss an opportunity 
to revel in excess, to transgress every boundary placed in front of 
us. The problem is that the pleasures of transgression are no longer 
experienced as they were in the past. It is difficult to enjoy that which 
we are instructed to enjoy. This absence, this sense of cynicism, irony 
and depression tied to insubstantial consumer indulgences, can be seen 
throughout our culture by anyone who has a mind to look. If we are 
to identify the fundamental causes of these feelings of atomisation 
and dissatisfaction, we must dig beneath empirical reality and talk 
honestly and openly about the powerful forces and stark processes we 
find there (see Hall and Winlow, 2015). Our political systems appear 
unable to produce appealing and comprehensible alternatives to our 
present way of life, and this is having a corrosive effect on both our 
culture and our society. 
There is a tendency among many liberal social scientists to deny all 
of this. Many appear to find comfort in optimism and dismiss such 
critique as overly generalised and reductive. They want to discuss 
those minority groups whose lives remain animated by politics and 
those who can still utilise a functional symbolic order. They want to 
direct our attention to the young who, they believe, are the bearers of 
a gleaming banner that will in the near future replace darkness with 
light. However, the compulsory optimism of liberal social science 
actively prevents us from taking the steps that must be taken if we are 
to do what needs to be done. The compulsion to continually strive to 
identify difference has had a paralysing effective on the social sciences. It 
has led to the continual postponement of conclusions, and an absolute 
refusal to acknowledge those things that bond us all together, those 
things to which we are all subject, and those things that are shared by 
all. Our culture has also been subject to a corresponding process that 
has sought to denigrate and lampoon intellectualism. We have seen 
the rise of a deeply regrettable base populism that is closely tied to 
ongoing processes of marketisation and commodification. 
To drag the social free from its moorings in political economy is a 
profound mistake, and it is a mistake made with alarming regularity by 
social scientists today. Given the scale of our problems, we must now 
be honest enough to recognise that the social cannot and will not be 
rejuvenated, reconfigured or made ethical by some nebulous movement 
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The uses of catastrophism
of the spirit, or by the sudden and magical appearance of a new cultural 
imperative to abandon selfishness and intolerance and adopt an open 
and altruistic attitude to others (see Winlow et al, 2015, 2016). To 
do what needs to be done to set us on a better course we must move 
beyond the sphere of culture. There can be no quick and easy fix. We 
cannot simply shame, encourage or cajole the people into setting aside 
their differences. We cannot simply instruct the people to be a little 
nicer to each other and hope against hope that our edicts are acted on. 
There is no slight adjustment we can make, and no simple story we can 
spin, that will get us back on track. If we truly hope to rejuvenate the 
social, rather than simply cover up its continued disintegration with 
shallow, presentational displays of charitable fellow-feeling, we must 
recognise that the roots of the problems we face today go much deeper. 
If social scientists remain dedicated to the pursuit of truth, they must 
start digging down through the various sedimentary layers of reality 
until they can locate and accurately identify fundamental causes.
Facing up to reality
We should start by facing up to this stark fact: social life today cannot 
return to full bloom if in our economic life we remain fetishistically 
attached to a market logic that actively cultivates social competition, 
anxiety and envy, and reallocates money and resources from mainstream 
civil society upwards towards a plutocratic elite that has already amassed 
a staggering proportion of global wealth (see Piketty, 2014). We cannot 
recreate the social if the economic platform on which we must build 
it forces us all to pursue our own interests at the expense of almost 
everything else. If we clear away all the ideology and all of the detailed 
analysis of capitalism and its history, we find at its core a fundamental 
exchange relation that compels economic actors to attempt to take 
from the other more than they are willing to give in return. This basic 
logic has shaped the West’s cultural life for hundreds of years, but, 
because the defence mechanisms erected during the post-war social 
democratic settlement have been abandoned, we sense, in a general 
and imprecise manner, its growing power and proximity. We recognise 
the growth of individualism and the decline of collectivism, and, if 
we are honest with ourselves, we can see the decline of community 
life and the growing prevalence of narcissism, envy and anxiety in our 
cultures. Indeed, the culture industries have for decades attempted to 
convince the masses that these processes are positive, and that we should 
celebrate and revel in the opportunities and freedoms that have arisen 
as the old ‘repressive’ social order has splintered and decayed. Altruism 
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survives, of course, but its continued existence does little to challenge 
the dominant ideology. The continued existence of charitable impulses 
should not be taken as evidence that the people remain essentially good, 
kind and sympathetic, or that capitalism’s attempt to occupy and control 
our cultural life is forever destined to fail. Rather, charity these days 
acts to cushion the hammer blows of economic restructuring, and it 
allows the titans of the free market the opportunity to assuage their 
guilt while encouraging ‘economic development’ and the expansion 
and evolution of markets. Charity is increasingly tied to the logic of the 
market; it is in no way antagonistic to it. One of the key distinctions 
between the liberal left and the radical left is relevant here: do we want 
to live in a society in which there is more charity and in which more 
care is shown towards the poorest, or do we want to live in a society 
in which charity isn’t necessary and in which poverty as we know it 
today has been eliminated? 
We must be honest enough to acknowledge that the degeneration 
of the social is connected to the total dominance of global capitalism 
and its ideological support systems, and the absence of any conceivable 
alternative to what already exists. The changing characteristics of 
markets, and the gradual evolution of social and political attitudes 
towards the profit motive, inevitably inform our culture and the general 
character of our shared social life. 
It is a profound mistake to believe that we can reconstruct a vibrant 
and nourishing social life without controlling or replacing the raw 
asocial imperatives that lie at the core of our economy. We are 
now living through a period of quite profound social and political 
turmoil, and much of this turmoil stems from the total domination of 
markets over people and the attachment of our elites to the neoliberal 
economic model, which has been stripped of its ideological character 
and repackaged as pure economic pragmatism. There once existed the 
political will to regulate and constrain the profit motive, and to use its 
herculean power to secure social goods that benefited all. As the social 
democratic consensus gave way to the current neoliberal consensus, 
the common good was abandoned as a fundamental political concern. 
In fact, over time, such ideals were mocked and pilloried to such an 
extent that even politicians on the mainstream left found it necessary 
to utilise the language of the market to construct a positive image of 
the future. These political and economic changes had an impact on 
society and culture in ways we are only now beginning to get to grips 
with. The collective identities of the modern age were broken apart 
and splintered into a dazzling array of subject positions. Thatcher 
famously claimed that society did not exist. Her political successes 
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The uses of catastrophism
and the longevity of the consensus she helped to establish made this 
antisocial libertarian proclamation a reality.
Now is the time to push past the dead ideas that clutter the field 
of the contemporary social sciences and to think anew about what 
the continued supremacy of markets will mean for our shared life 
together. We need new ideas now more than ever, and we should not 
be afraid to offer a measured dose of economic determinism when it 
is appropriate to do so. Only when we recognise and begin to come 
to terms with the interconnectedness of politics, society and economy 
can we construct reasonable accounts of the mess we’re in and how we 
might begin the process of extracting ourselves from it.
The problems that exist today cannot be fixed with carefully 
calibrated policy interventions. I am often told by colleagues on the 
left that activist movements can win significant concessions from 
government, and that the accumulation of a broad range of small and 
pragmatic reforms can set our society back on a more equitable footing. 
There is a small measure of truth in this. Small victories can be achieved. 
However, the overall trend is quite clear. Activist movements may win 
small skirmishes here and there, but these minor victories are as nothing 
when underneath our feat a grinding tectonic realignment is separating 
us from the very things that make civil society possible. Piecemeal 
adjustments here and there simply will not do. Things are trending 
downwards. Our economies look set to experience a prolonged period 
of low or no growth, and, of course, further crashes remain highly 
likely. There is a shocking lack of reasonably remunerated productive 
jobs for young people right across the deindustrialised countries of 
the West, and there is little sign that our politicians are willing to act 
to realign global trade flows. We are already seeing the first signs of 
resources wars, and an unseemly corporate scramble to secure mineral 
wealth is well underway. Energy and food and water security are now 
of significant concern to Western governments, and climate change 
and geopolitical turmoil are driving millions away from their countries 
of origin and towards what seems like the wealth and tranquillity of 
developed Western states. The influx of migrants to the Eurozone has 
already fuelled nationalist politics across the continent, and this trend 
looks set to continue. Problems of this magnitude cannot be fixed by 
carefully calibrated policy interventions. The roots of these problems 
are buried deep, and messing around with surface changes will be of 
little use to us. 
Our national economies are now so intertwined that, even if a radical 
leftist party were to win office, it would be difficult for a national 
government to genuinely transform things. We need new forms of 
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Building better societies
intervention that challenge and move beyond the powerfully restrictive 
framework of global political economy. I am told repeatedly by my 
colleagues on the left that small interventions add up, and that small 
adjustments are better than no adjustments at all. However, I remain 
convinced that we must look towards the bigger picture if we are to 
avoid the gradual degeneration of those things we value about the 
present. As I see it, the key question for sociologists now is not what 
practical measures we can take that will improve things slightly for those 
who suffer most. Rather, it is how we can intervene, and just how 
deep we need to go, in order to create a sustainable social world that 
values and includes every citizen. Of course, to answer this question 
we need to free ourselves from the constraints of empiricism and once 
again grant ourselves license to interpret and imagine. We must also 
free ourselves from the dead ideas of the 20th century and construct 
our own intellectual frameworks that are capable of coming to terms 
with the world as it is now.
Left-leaning sociologists often believe that ‘speaking truth to power’ 
has the capacity to transform our social and political future. They 
believe that if they can prove a policy doesn’t work, or that the policy 
is, in fact, counterproductive, power will be forced to change tack. 
Sociologists will then have used their expertise to correct an injustice 
or overcome an impediment to human flourishing. However, it is now 
high time to think again about concentrated power and its willingness 
to engage in democratic negotiation. Perhaps the injunction to ‘speak 
truth to power’ always sent the committed sociologist on a fool’s 
errand. The fact is, power already knows the truth. After many years 
of engaged social research, it is perfectly clear to me that injustice is 
not an aberration. It is not a sign that the system is failing to function 
adequately. Injustice is an unavoidable outcome of our global political 
economy. These injustices are not signs of some kind of blockage in 
the system that needs to be addressed and removed; rather, they are 
concrete indicators of the logic of the system itself. Contemporary 
global capitalism continues in its present form by gradually withdrawing 
from modernism’s various social commitments. Injustices continue 
to stack up on top of each other, and this will not change until we 
become capable of reanimating our political systems and using them 
to stage a fundamental intervention that changes our future by setting 
us on a new course.
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Historic challenges
As others in this collection have already noted, the gap between rich 
and poor in Britain is now as wide as it has been for over a century. 
This gap has a huge effect on civil society. It foments envy. It breeds 
antagonisms. With every year that passes it becomes harder to maintain 
the pretence of an inclusive social order that values and welcomes 
all. Of course, and despite what the media tell us, Western societies 
remain very rich indeed. The problem is that this wealth is increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of the few. The rich have successfully cast 
aside any obligation they might once have felt to mainstream civil 
society (see Chapter Thirteen, this volume). They have abstracted 
themselves from the social, and tend to look back at it with a mixture 
of fear and contempt. They do not live in real neighbourhoods, and 
they rarely make forays into public space. Their interactions with 
others are often contractual, and these interactions always take place 
in the shadow of their own abundant wealth. The super-rich today, 
it appears, exclude themselves from the social. They set themselves 
apart from it, and imagine themselves to have transcended its rules 
and responsibilities. They are sovereign individuals who recognise no 
external authority that might force them to abandon the pursuit of 
their own economic self-interest. 
At the other end of the social scale we have growing numbers of 
people who cannot access the things that appear to symbolise full 
social inclusion. Traditional working-class work has all but disappeared. 
Production has been shifted to low-wage and low-regulation economies 
in the developing world, and members of Britain’s old industrial class 
have been forced to compete with one another for insecure jobs that 
are often completely devoid of the positive symbolism usually associated 
with traditional working-class work. Working in a shipyard, in a factory 
or down a coal mine could be difficult and demanding, but, for the 
most part, it paid enough to raise a family. Industrial jobs were often 
quite secure. Workers could plan for the future. They could set down 
roots and live a life free from the perpetual anxiety and insecurity 
that hangs like a cloud over contemporary labour markets in the de-
industrialised West. Sociological studies of life on the shop floor tell us 
that the industrial worker was often able to retain the belief in the value 
of their own labour. Skills were considered important and worthwhile, 
and it was possible to imagine contributing to a workplace community 
composed to [[of?]] others with whom they shared a great deal. In 
some cases the industrial worker also carried with them a vague sense 
that in their daily labours they were doing their bit to drive the nation 
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forward and out of the gloom and want that enshrouded the first third 
of the 20th century.
During the 1950s and 1960s, things improved rapidly for the working 
class. Work became safer and wages rose to the extent that the worker 
and his family were able to access the new forms of consumerism that 
were transforming the nation’s cultural life. Of course, this progress was 
not a gift bestowed on the lower orders by a magnanimous modern 
capitalism. This progress was won by the political organisation of the 
working class and its steadfast refusal to capitulate to the interests of 
capital. During these years it remained possible to imagine an alternative 
to capitalism. Left-wing radicalism still existed across the continent, and 
it was in capital’s best interests to take a seat at the negotiating table. 
Capitalism was forced to abandon the aggressive asocial accumulation of 
the pre-war years, it was forced to contribute higher taxes, and it now 
had an interventionist state to deal with. However, capitalism survived, 
and, as the system rumbled onwards, social democracy integrated the 
radicals at the margins. Capitalism’s fundamental exchange relation did 
not change in the middle third of the 20th century. Modern capitalism 
was not kinder and more considerate. Rather, politics constrained 
capitalism’s inherent drive to commodify reality and squeeze from it 
every last drop of surplus value. The organisational logic of capitalist 
markets was used to drive development and generate tax revenues 
that enabled the state to pursue positive social ends. None of this 
happened naturally. It required human energy and commitment, and a 
functioning political culture that encouraged people to think through 
their position in the market and the interests they shared with others.
The working class of today face a very different economic reality. Our 
political culture has grown sterile. Liberal individualism has achieved 
unprecedented success on the field of culture. The collective identities 
of the modern working class have fragmented into a multitude of 
subject positions, and the institutions that enabled working men and 
women to educate themselves about capitalism and their place within it 
have all but disappeared. Despite what many optimistic social scientists 
claim, Twitter and Facebook are not capable of filling the gap they have 
left. All are enjoined to see themselves as unique individuals who must 
fight hard to secure their own interests. Our politicians appear totally 
divorced from the reality faced by ordinary working and non-working 
people. They show no willingness to intervene in our economy to set 
us on a new course. From time to time they acknowledge the problems 
that have been created by our commitment to the free market, but 
they always then seek to trade these problems off against the supposed 
benefits of an unregulated market. Now, it seems, all politicians must 
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be committed to ensuring that capitalist expansionism continues 
unimpeded. Above all things, we must ensure that our gross domestic 
product returns to growth. 
The power of labour unions has declined enormously and the 
Labour Party has, for many years, been utterly dedicated to the basic 
principles of the free market. Few of those who work in working-class 
jobs are able to access the positive workplace symbolism that existed 
during the modern epoch. Short-term contracts are increasingly the 
norm, and those working in the lower reaches of the service sector 
expect to move quite regularly between employers. Pay is down in 
real terms, and growing numbers of people find themselves incapable 
of adopting the forms of life that signal full socioeconomic inclusion. 
This group is often described by sociologists as ‘socially excluded’, 
but this phrase doesn’t quite capture the reality of their position. Of 
course, consumerism lies at the core of what we mean by a ‘socially 
included lifestyle’, and many of this group remain committed if poorly 
resourced consumers. They do not create fundamentally different forms 
of culture, and they do not adopt fundamentally different values to live 
by. There is no stark gap between the included and excluded. Rather, 
they form part of a large and growing pan-continental, multi-ethnic 
and economically redundant social group that are forced to compete 
against one another for the forms of low-level service work that keep 
Western economies ticking over while abstract financial markets 
continue their mad dance. Global capitalism no longer needs them as a 
productive force. Capital needed them as consumers, and it welcomes 
their involvement in new forms of digitised capital accumulation. 
Sociologists have produced a number of interesting accounts of this 
particular marginalised group, but the vast majority of these accounts 
are predicated on the assumption that the best thing to do would be 
to re-include those who are currently excluded. But what good does 
this do if the fundamental mechanisms that drive ‘exclusion’ in the 
first place remain in place (see Winlow and Hall, 2013)? Most of the 
social exclusion literature in Britain displays a commitment to social 
democratic reform, and there is not too much wrong with that. 
However, most analysts tend to direct their ire at the Conservative 
Party, as if the government of the day had it within their purview 
to magically produce new forms of well-paid labour capable of re-
establishing security and stability for the majority. Only very rarely 
do accounts of social exclusion wrestle with the thorny problem of 
global political economy.
Only an intervention of historic proportions would be capable of 
creating stable and rewarding forms of working in Britain’s thoroughly 
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de-industrialised and marketised economy. We cannot ‘fix’ social 
exclusion with small-scale adjustments to social policy. To create 
meaningful labour in Britain these days would involve stepping out 
of global trade flows that ensure that most production takes place 
in established surplus economies and debt-financed consumption 
continues in the de-industrialised West. Taking this course of action 
would be monumental, and the effects of such a move would, in the 
first instance at least, negatively affect the consumer lifestyles of the 
majority of Britain’s citizens. These are big issues that require serious 
intellectual and political engagement. If we truly hope to revitalise our 
society and produce the forms of work that guarantee inclusion, we 
must honestly appraise the world as it is today. We cannot continue 
to occupy a restricted and sterile intellectual space that encourages 
us to focus only on small-scale adjustments to our welfare system, or 
directing a little more public funding towards those who suffer most. 
What would it mean to truly commit to economic inclusion? Could 
a new commitment to green energy and ameliorating the effects of 
climate change produce the new jobs needed to reintegrate those at 
the economic margins? What would a new social democratic project 
look like today? Can we introduce a new basic citizen’s income? How 
would we fund such an intervention? Might state-funded national and 
regional investment banks begin to revitalise the economies of de-
industrialised zones in Northern England, Scotland and Wales? Can 
new technologies enable us to think again about central planning? 
How might we begin to nationalise key economic sectors without 
causing yet further economic distress? How can we fund a welfare 
system that gives us the services we want? How can we create global 
accord on issues related to the management of climate change? These 
are, I think, some of the questions we need to be wrestling with. There 
are no easy answers. 
As we begin to think through how we might change our future, we 
can at least draw strength and motivation from the absolute certainty 
that the path we’re on leads to catastrophe. If we stay as we are, if we 
remain wedded to the reductive logic of the market, if we risk nothing 
and turn away from our most pressing problems, much that we value 
and much that we take for granted these days will disappear, and life 
will get a lot harder for the vast majority.
An enlightened catastrophism
I conclude only with the basic claim that we must ditch unworldly 
optimism and adopt an approach that stresses an enlightened 
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catastrophism. But what does this mean? First, we must consciously 
accept the titanic scale of the problems we face. Without concerted 
action now, these problems will grow and mutate and drive the 
production of new problems that are, at the moment, difficult to 
identify with clarity. 
In an exercise shorn of sentiment, we must imagine what it will 
be like to occupy a future in which the problems we face now have 
been played out, a future in which, as it were, all our chickens have 
come home to roost. This is a future shaped by the unwillingness of 
our generation, and our political leaders, to act now to prevent these 
problems coming fully to fruition. What if we continue to do very 
little to prevent the incremental rise in global temperatures? What 
if the polar ice caps continue to melt, and methane continues to be 
released into the atmosphere? What if we continue to stand by as an 
ever greater proportion of global wealth is taken by the 1%? What if 
the political left continues to atrophy and new nationalist movements 
continue to absorb the anger and frustration of ordinary people? What 
if the power of global corporations continues to grow? What if we 
continue to fail to fund research into clean energy? What if we refuse 
to take on the work of rebalancing our economies and integrating those 
currently at the margins? What if we remain fetishistically tied to oil, 
gas and coal? What if the possessive individualism of today continues 
to advance, and we fail to construct new forms of collectivism? Think 
about it. Discard the old trope of incremental progress, and ignore the 
comfort of assuming that a range of easy solutions will appear. Imagine 
yourself and those you love occupying that world.
Once we have imagined this future – a future that will come into 
being if we continue on as we are – we can begin to think again about 
what can be done in the here and now to set us on a different course. 
The shock of recognition and conscious acceptance must compel us 
to begin to do what needs to be done. So, ignore those who tell you 
to cheer up and look on the bright side. Face the future and look it 
square in the face, and then join with others to fashion the forms of 
intervention that can arrest our slow descent into the chaos of the 
future.
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